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portfolio choices with asset returns within an isoelastic utility framework.  The bound is 
determined from the set of conditions that ensure the optimality of consumption behavior by 
financial market non-participants.  It represents the lowest possible cost rationalizing 
observed non-participation choices by providing a measure of the forgone utility gains from 
participation for observed non-participants.  Such gains are related both to the magnitude of 
financial market returns and to the opportunity of smoothing consumption, with the benefits 
of the former decreasing in the degree of relative risk aversion and those of the latter 
increasing in it.  Using the US Consumer Expenditure Survey, I find that a yearly cost of at 
least $70 is needed to rationalize non-participation for a consumer with log utility and who 
can trade in the S&P500 CI.  This lower bound declines rapidly in risk aversion for levels of 
risk aversion up to two/three; for higher values, it levels off.  A yearly cost of at least $31 is 
needed to rationalize non-participation for a consumer with log utility and who can trade in 
US Treasury Bills.  This lower bound rises steadily in risk aversion. 
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1.  Introduction 
A large number of studies has suggested that observed asset returns are inconsistent 
with consumption choices as predicted by the standard neo-classical model for 
consumption.  The testable implications of this model have, in fact, repeatedly been 
proven to be at odds with empirical evidence and have given rise to the equity 
premium and other asset pricing puzzles
2.  Such empirical inconsistency has generally 
been rationalized by the literature either assuming that agents are highly averse to 
consumption risk or conjecturing that trading stock is much more costly than trading 
bonds.  Recently, it has also been shown that accounting for limited stock market 
participation might be important for explaining the puzzles, since allowing for 
differences in the consumption patterns of asset holders and non-holders tends to 
lower the risk aversion implied by the model
3.  However, no attempt has been made to 
rationalize non-participation.  Non-participation to financial markets is the main issue 
this paper wants to address and does so by verifying whether it can be rationalized on 
the ground of transaction costs that are small enough to be realistic.  The second issue 
the paper deals with is that of the differences in the costs of trading distinct assets.  In 
the literature, cost differentials generally result from calibration exercises, whereas 
here I identify the bounds to the costs directly and look for evidence that trading risky 
assets is costlier than trading riskless ones. 
  The approach adopted to identify the transaction costs is based on the 
observation that the standard way of examining the consistency of a model with the 
empirical evidence is to test a set of first-order conditions against the data.  The 
rejection of such conditions suggests that there are gains the consumer could make by 
modifying her consumption.  However, if such gains are not too large, a possible 
interpretation of the sub-optimal behavior is that the consumer faces small transaction 
costs every time she approaches financial markets and the costs of modifying 
consumption are higher than the utility gains.  By measuring such gains it is possible 
to determine a set of bounds on the level of transaction costs that help rationalize non-
participation and, ultimately, can reconcile asset returns and consumption choices. 
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  For the estimation of such cost bounds, I extend Luttmer (1999) and determine 
the lower bounds as the minimal costs that rationalize non-participation, i.e. as those 
costs exactly equal to the utility gains from trade.  However, unlike Luttmer, whose 
work is based on aggregate information, I use individual level data, which allow to 
distinguish between actual participants and non-participants to financial markets, 
instead of simply characterizing traders and non-traders in the time period under 
scrutiny.  As a consequence, the nature of the costs I focus upon is substantially 
different from the nature of the costs in Luttmer’s analysis.  In fact, the frictions he 
considers are the costs that the representative agent must pay to trade and modify her 
consumption in the current period and in one or at most few subsequent periods.  
Instead, by distinguishing between participants and non-participants, this paper 
focuses on the costs any individual faces in order to actually participate to financial 
markets.  In addition, because of the use of aggregate data, the validity of Luttmer’s 
results is limited and his analysis applies strictly only to an agent who happens to 
consume US per-capita consumption because, in the presence of fixed costs, the 
conditions upon which aggregation results are based do not hold.  For this reason, the 
use of micro data is particularly desirable in a framework where fixed costs play a 
role.  The use of individual-level data brings about several other advantages.  First, it 
allows to verify whether there are important cost differences when trading different 
portfolios, - at least to the extent that the data permit to distinguish between different 
assets.  Second, it allows to take into account the effects that individual specific 
factors have on utility reducing the scope for unobserved heterogeneity and, 
consequently, the potential for bias.  Last, given the availability of some panel 
dimension in the data I use, it is possible to account for differences in the covariance 
between individual consumption growth and asset returns. 
  Another empirical paper studying the interaction between market frictions and 
household portfolio choice with micro data is Vissing-Jørgensen (1999). Vissing-
Jørgensen (1999) is built on the methodology of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1996) 
and differs substantially from my type of analysis.  In fact, the objective of my work 
is to determine the minimal costs rationalizing the choice of holding no equity despite 
the premium and I find that relatively small costs can indeed justify such behavior.  
Instead, Vissing-Jørgensen (1999) uses a dynamic sample selection model to gather 
evidence of state dependency in financial market participation - which is symptomatic 
of entry and transaction costs - and a censored regression model to determine the  4 
distribution of the per-period participation costs.  She estimates the median of this 
cost to be around $200
4, which is a higher figure than the ones I obtain, but is fully 
consistent with my results. 
  The costs I consider in the paper are fixed per-period participation costs that 
must be paid at the time of investment and in each subsequent period as long as the 
agent stays in the market.  Since I estimate the bounds as foregone utility gains of 
non-participation, the costs I set limits upon can include both cash outlays and 
“figurative” charges, such as brokerage fees and other commissions, bid-ask spreads, 
money/time spent understanding financial markets and determining the optimal 
portfolio, money/time spent setting up and managing the accounts, value of time spent 
trading and any other kind of opportunity cost of investors’ time in processing 
information. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, I discuss the model 
for the gains from financial market participation and relate such gains to the trading 
costs.  In Section 3, I examine the econometric issues arising from the estimation of 
the model and present the estimation procedure.  In Section 4, I describe the data and 
analyze the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Measuring Transaction Costs 
Consider an environment where households have access to several means to substitute 
consumption over time.  In particular, they can accumulate real assets, currency 
and/or financial securities.  The securities can be traded after the payment of a fixed 
cost that can vary between the market for risky assets and the market for riskless ones.  
Households have additively separable preferences over consumption and the per-
period utility function is strictly increasing and concave.  Let  ,... 2 , 1 , } { = t c t
h  be 
household  h observed sequence of consumption choices.  These choices are the 
solution to some unobservable maximization problem involving labour supply, saving 
and portfolio composition.  On the basis of portfolio composition, it is possible to 
distinguish among three types of households: those who hold both risky and riskless 
assets (type 1); those who hold only riskless assets (type 2); and those who have 
chosen not to participate to any financial market (type 3).  Households are utility 
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corresponds approximately to 350 dollars of year 2000.  5 
maximizers.  As a consequence, since at time t they could have chosen any other 
sequence of consumption bundles, their time t expected gain from deviating from 
t
h c } {  must be negative.  In particular, for those households who have chosen not to 
participate to some or both financial markets, time t expected utility gain, 
*
,t h y , from 
adopting an alternative saving/consumption strategy involving participation, must be 
non-positive, i.e. 
t i I u x v E y t h
i
t h t h ∀ = ≤ = + ; 3 , 2 , 0 ] | ) , , ( [ , 1 ,
*
, δ       ( 1 )  
where (.) 1 ,
i
t h v +  is the utility gain that type i household h can obtain by deviating from 
the observed sequence of consumption choices, t
h c } { .  Under the assumption of 
additively separable preferences, the utility gain of type i household h can be written 
in the following way: 
{ } { } ) exp( ) ( )) , ( ~ ( ) exp( ) ( )) , ( ~ ( (.) 1 , 1 , 1 , , , , 1 , + + + + − + − = t h t h
i




t h u c U x c U u c U x c U v δ β δ (2) 
) ( ,t h c U  is the utility from the level of consumption that has been chosen.   
)) , ( ~ ( , δ x c U
i
t h  is the utility in case of optimal participation to the financial market(s) 
that type i household h has chosen to stay out of.  Participation implies paying the 
fixed cost δ  and holding the optimally determined portfolio x of securities.   
t
i
h x c )} , ( ~ { δ  denotes consumption in case of participation.  β  is a positive subjective 
discount rate and uh,t is an unobservable random taste shifter which captures 
individual heterogeneity.  uh,t represents all the unobservable and unaccounted for 
factors that affect individual portfolio choices and that I do not explicitly model or 
control for.  Specifically, within the framework defined by (1) and (2), it captures all 
those unobservable features of individual preferences that influence the financial 
market participation choice and therefore determine the size of the loss from deviating 
from  t
h c } {.    ] | [. ,t h I E  is household h expectation conditional on the information 
available at time t.  (1) and (2) imply that, at time t, given the information available, 
financial market non-participants should not be able to pay the fixed cost, participate 
optimally to the market(s) they have chosen to stay out of and obtain a higher level of 
utility.  Inequalities like (1) must hold for any t and t+s, s≥ 1
5. 
                                                            
5 Focusing the analysis on two adjacent periods is not restrictive, as long as the per-period costs of 
participating to the market for one-period securities and to the market for n-period securities are the 
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  The inequality in (1) does not allow to identify the fixed cost parameters that 
would reconcile observed consumption choices with the assumption that agents are 
rational and choose optimally.  However, if the instantaneous utility function is 
strictly concave,  ) , , ( 1 , u x v
i
t h δ +  is strictly decreasing in the fixed costs δ . Then, I can 
replace  δ  with d≤δ  and the inequalities in (1) with equalities and look for lower 
bounds to the costs.  Such lower bound coincides with the level of participation costs 
that would make the utility in case of participation exactly equal to the utility in case 
of non-participation.  In other words, it coincides with the levels of costs offsetting 
exactly the gain from participation. 
 
  Two issues are worth discussing at this stage.  The first relates to the 
benchmark I use to quantify the gain/loss from participation.  As I have mentioned in 
the Introduction, the model is motivated by the desire of rationalizing observed 
behavior as optimal, despite the empirical inconsistency of the neo-classical model for 
consumption noted by Hansen and Singleton (1983), Mehra and Prescott (1985) and 
Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)
6, among others.  The fixed cost bounds are essentially 
measures of the benefit from participation and their interpretation is straightforward: 
the lower the bounds, the smaller the expected utility gain from participation and, 
consequently, the lower the transaction costs needed to make participation 
disadvantageous and, therefore, non-participation rational.  Thus, for this exercise to 
be interesting, I must determine the individual optimal investment in those assets that 
households do not hold and compare the utility associated to such portfolio with the 
utility associated to the choice made, ceteris paribus.  Then, for those who hold only 
riskless assets, let  2 , , 2 2 ,
2
,




+ + + + = t t t h t h t R x c c  denote time t 
and time t+1 consumption in case of participation to the market for such asset.  For 
those who have chosen not to hold any financial assets, let 
2 , , 2 1 , , 1 12 ,
3
,




+ + + + + + = t t t h t t t h t h t h R x R x c c  denote time 
t and time t+1 consumption in case of participation to the markets for risky and 
                                                            
same.  In this instance, by an arbitrage argument, the one period returns on the two assets must be the 
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6 The three studies mentioned above characterize the inconsistency of the theory with the data in 
different ways.  Hansen and Singleton (1983) reject the overidentifying restrictions of the model.   
Mehra and Prescott (1985) point out an equity premium puzzle.  Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) 
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riskless assets.  δ 2 is the fixed cost for the market for risky assets. δ 12 is the joint cost 
of participating to both financial markets
7.  Given the participation cost,  1 x  and  2 x  are 
the individual optimal holdings of riskless and risky assets with time t prices q1 and q2 
and time t+1 payoffs R1,t,t+1 and R2,t,t+1, respectively.  As it will be shown in the next 
section, the optimal portfolios are determined by exploiting the fact that asset returns 
are to some extent predictable using a pricing kernel based on investors’ utility.  The 
specification adopted for 
i
t h c ,
~  and 
i
t h c 1 ,
~
+  is a simplification and implies that the 
resources to be invested in the market subject to a cost are obtained by reallocating 
expenditure over time without modifying saving, whatever form it takes.  Yet, since 
financial assets involving higher costs carry on average also higher returns, it is 
reasonable to expect that after paying the cost and investing in the higher return asset, 
the investor moves into this asset some of her wealth accumulated in other lower 
return assets.  Alternatively, the income effect from higher returns might induce her to 
increase her consumption at time t, reducing overall savings
8.  The specification I 
have adopted has the advantage of not requiring the computation of household cash-
in-hand, which is not directly available from the data I use.  However, the inability to 
use individual cash-in-hand can be expected to bias downward the estimates, 
especially in the case where some asset is not subject to transaction costs.  However, 
as it will be shown, information available on household after-tax income allows to 
quantify the importance of this bias. 
  The second issue worth mentioning relates to the nature of the costs of   
financial market participation vis á vis the fact that the analysis focuses explicitly only 
on two time periods and neglects any continuation payoff.  The focus on only two 
                                                            
determine a set of bounds on the first two moments of a generic stochastic asset-pricing factor and find 
that the moments of the marginal rate of substitution are inconsistent with such bounds.  
7 Given the nature of the costs, (1) and (2) for type 3 households do not allow to identify the 
participation cost to each individual market separately, but only a single cost that pertains to both 
markets jointly. 
8 Consider for simplicity a household that holds its savings in a zero return costless asset.  The budget 
constraints for time t and t+1 can be written as:  t t t t s s y c − + = − 1  and  1 1 1 + + + − + = t t t t s s y c , where 
t c ,  t y and  t s  are time t consumption, income and saving, respectively.  If households were allowed to 
reshuffle their savings when participating hypothetically to financial markets, then  t c ~  and  1
~
+ t c  could 
be defined as:  δ − − + = t t t t x s c c ~  and  1 , 1 1
~
+ + + + − = t t t t t t R x s c c , where  t c ~  is consumption in case of 
financial market participation;  t t s c +  is time t cash-in-hand, i.e. it is the amount of resources available 
for either consumption or investment at time t; xt is the optimal portfolio of costly assets with return 
1 , + t t R  and δ  is the per-period participation cost.  The “simpler” specification I have adopted is 
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time periods can be justified by assuming that households are at an optimum 
conditional on the presence of transaction costs.  The counterfactual implies switching 
consumption between the two periods under scrutiny, leaving everything else 
unchanged (at the optimum) and consequently I do not need to keep into account any 
other date.  For this to hold, costs must be fixed and per-period.  In principle, financial 
market participation involves three types of costs: an entry cost, a transaction/trading 
cost and a per-period participation cost.  Entry costs consist in the time and money 
spent determining the household optimal portfolio and, to most extent, are likely to be 
fixed.  Trading costs are likely to have a fixed component, consisting in commissions 
and in the value of time spent trading, and a variable one, proportional to the amount 
traded, related to bid-ask spreads and to commissions variable components.  Finally, 
the per-period participation costs represent all the portfolio management monetary 
and opportunity costs.  The different types of costs are likely to affect participation 
choices in different ways.  In particular, when entry costs are present, the number of 
periods that households expect to stay in the market becomes crucial in determining 
investment choices.  Similarly, when trading costs exist, the length of the investment 
is a crucial factor.  Finally, in the presence of per-period costs, the length of the 
investment and/or of participation is irrelevant only if asset returns are assumed to be 
exogenous and, therefore, independent on the number of financial market participants, 
which in turn depends on the costs.  Reasonably, all three types of costs can be 
expected to exist.  The assumption of fixed per-period participation costs together 
with the focus on one period participation and investment can cause the actual costs to 
be somewhat underestimated if the entry and the trading costs are the most significant 
cost component and/or household investments are very long term.  In fact, in this 
instance the actual gains from participation would be larger than the one estimated 
with the model in (1) and (2).  The empirical evidence on the nature of the costs and 
on households movements in and out of financial markets is rather scarce.  Yet, as to 
the first issue, the wide availability of low cost mutual funds is believed to have 
reduced effectively the costs of buying and trading a well-diversified portfolio.  As to 
the second, using portfolio choice data from the 1984, 1989 and 1994 waves of the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Vissing-Jørgensen (1999) finds widespread 
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directly available from the data.  9 
movements in and out of financial markets, with many households participating in one 
year but not the others.  Such observed behavior suggests that household investments 
are rather short term and is consistent with the view that entry and trading costs are 
limited.  Thus, the main cost components of financial market participation are likely 
to be portfolio management costs, related both to the time and money spent 
determining the optimal asset portfolio and to the time and money spent following 
financial markets, in order to form expectations on future returns and change the 
investment accordingly.  If this is the case, although the former of these costs are 
likely to be somewhat higher for first-time investor (but not necessarily for new 
entrants), the assumption of fixed per-period participation costs should not cause the 
bound underestimation to be serious. 
 
3.  Estimation Issues 
3.1. Econometric  Issues 
As explained in Section 2, after replacing the inequality in (1) with an equality, the 
model 
t i u d x v E
i
t h t ∀ = = + ; 3 , 2 0 )] , , ( [ 1 ,         ( 3 )  
allows to identify and measure a bound to the cost of financial markets participation.  
Such measure is provided by the value of d equalizing the expected utility from 
planned consumption to the expected utility from consumption in case of participation 
to some additional financial market, whose participation costs want to be quantified.  
One way of interpreting the fixed cost bound d is in terms of Hicks compensating 
variation for a change in prices from the set of (unobservable) prices implicit in the 
individual preferences to observable market prices.  As a consequence, the cost 
bounds are in principle heterogeneous.  Because of the lack of a long panel dimension 
in the data used, it is not possible to estimate consistently the bounds at the household 
level.  However, I can compute an average individual household expected gain that 
will yield an estimate of the lower bound to the transaction costs for a consumer with 
a mean expected gain.  Such estimate will differ from the mean of the individual 
lower bounds for a Jensen inequality term due to the fact that the utility gain function 
is strictly decreasing and concave in the cost.  The issue can be illustrated in the 
following way.  Assume that there are just two kinds of households.  For the first, the 
expected gain from financial market participation is set to zero by a cost equal to d1.   10
For the second, the expected gain is set to zero by a cost d2 , with d2 > d1.  The mean 
of the expected gains (and consequently the mean of the costs), d , is simply the 
average of d1 and d2.  Due to the inability of identifying the individual expected gains, 
I cannot determine d , but I can look for the bound to the cost for a consumer whose 
expected utility gain coincides with the households mean expected utility gain.  This 
estimate will differ from d  by a Jensen inequality term because of the non-linearity of 
the function, as shown in Figure 1. 
  Another issue worth mentioning relates to the omission of the information on 
financial market participants, which brings in the estimation a potential source of bias 
due to the censoring of the expected utility gain, 
*
,t h y .  If 
*
,t h y  sample mean differs 
from the population mean simply because the composition of the sample is different, 
the estimates of the fixed cost bounds based only on data on non-participants will be 
biased.  The issue can be addressed by identifying the selection rule and correcting for 
the possibility of selection bias by means of an equation explaining initial 
participation such as a latent variable model predicting asset holdings when the 
portfolio decision takes place
9.  Thus, let r
* be an underlying latent variable denoting 
the level of indirect utility associated to the portfolio choice of interest: 
t h t h











         ( 4 )  
where κ  is a kx1 vector of household specific observable characteristics and η h,t is a 
household specific unobservable variable.  For  0
*
, > t h r , participation occurs, in which 
case a dichotomous variable,  t h D , , is equal to one; otherwise, it is zero.  Then, if η h,t 
and the individual random taste shifter, uh,t, are distributed jointly as standard normal 
random variables and  { } { } 1 | ) exp( 1 | ) exp( , 1 ) ( , ) ( ≠ = ≠ + t h ht h t h ht h D u E D u E
10, the mean 
value of the expected utility gain in the sub-sample excluding participants can be 
written as (omitting the superscript i): 
                                                            
9 It is worth pointing out that the expected utility gain equation in (1) does not determine the household 
type.  It simply ensures the non-participants are happy to hold on to their choices. 
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where  {} ) (h E  is the mean taken across households, whereas  [] t E  is household 
conditional expectation.  Also,  
)] ( )) , ( ~ ( [ ) ( )) , ( ~ ( ) , ( ~




















ρ         ( 7 )  
where Φ  refers to the cumulative standard normal and ρ uη  is the correlation between 
uh,t and η h,t.  Thus, the model corrected to account for sample selection can be written 
as:  
t h u t h t h t h t h V s x v w E y , , 1 , , , ) , ( )] , ( ~ [ ξ ρ δ η + ⋅ = +        ( 8 )  
where ξ h,t is an error, such that  { } 0 1 | , , = ≠ t h t h h D E ξ .  In practice, when bounding the 
cost associated to the market for risky assets, the sample selection correction term will 
account for the exclusion of risky asset holders; when bounding the costs associated to 
the market for riskless assets, it will account for the exclusion of those who hold such 
assets. 
 
3.2. Estimation  Procedure 
The estimation of the parameters of interest takes two steps.  In the first step, I 
evaluate the sample selection correction term,  ) , ( , η ρ u t h V s .  Then, after substituting it 
in (8), in the second step, I estimate the household optimal portfolio and the 
transaction cost bound using a method of moment estimator.  The sample selection 
correction term entails the identification of two sets of parameters: the coefficients of 
the household specific observable characteristics in the latent variable model for 
portfolio choice, in (4), and the unobservable correlation between uh,t and η h,t, ρ uη . 
The first set of parameters can be obtained by maximum likelihood estimation of the 
bivariate probit associated to the latent variable model.  The unobservable correlation 
between uh,t and η h,t can hardly be identified and distinguished from the unknown 
                                                            
11 See the Appendix for the derivation of this result.  12
parameters that enter the expected utility gain function, given the multiplicative 
structure of the model in (8).  However, since ρ uη   ∈ [-1,+1], I can proceed and 
determine the range of values that the cost bounds can take on depending on the value 
of ρ uη .  Under the assumption of isoelastic utility, another parameter that cannot be 
identified within the model is the coefficient of relative risk aversion characterizing 
household preferences.  As I do with ρ uη , I assign relative risk aversion a range of 
values and verify how sensitive my estimates are to such parameter. 
 
3.2.1.  The Optimal Portfolio 
In order to identify the potential gains from financial market participation and 
measure the transaction cost bounds, the household optimal portfolio, x, must be 
determined.  Let  t h t h t h c g z f g x , , , ) , ( ) ( ⋅ = , where z is an mx1 vector of instruments that 
have been shown useful in predicting market returns; z varies over time and can be 
household specific.   (.) f  is a logit transformation of an mx1 vector g of parameters
12.  
The household optimal portfolio is simply the investment ensuring the maximum 
return in terms of utility, given the per-period participation costs.  Thus, it can be 
estimated by maximizing households utility in case of participation with respect to the 
vector of unknown parameters, g, given the fixed transaction cost, i.e. by solving the 
following problem: 
[ ] ) , ( )) ), ( ( ~ ( ) , ( )) ), ( ( ~ ( max , 1 , , , η η ρ δ β ρ δ u t h
i




V s g x c U V s g x c U E ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ +  
As I have mentioned before, the optimal portfolio is determined by exploiting the fact 
that asset returns are to some extent predictable.  Since, in practice, the vector of 
instruments z that I use does not vary across households, but varies only over time, 
optimal holdings cannot be estimated by exploiting across household variability, but 
only the variability over time.  Thus, I can compute x by solving: 
[ ] ) , ( )) ), ( ( ~ ( ) , ( )) ), ( ( ~ ( max , 1 , , , η η ρ δ β ρ δ u t h
i




V s g x c U V s g x c U E ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ +    (9) 
where 
∑ ⋅ = ⋅
−




t u t h
i
t h V s g x c U H V s g x c U ) , ( )) ), ( ( ~ ( ) , ( )) ), ( ( ~ ( , ,
1
, , η η ρ δ ρ δ  
                                                            
12 Specifically:  () ( )
1 ) ' exp( 1 ,
− + = g z g z f .  This specification is dictated primarily by computational 
considerations.  13
is time t mean household utility.  H
i
t is the number of households of type i who had 
their first interview in the t
th time period.  If the maximand is sufficiently smooth and 
an optimal portfolio, x(g)
*, associated to the fixed cost exists, then, in terms of first-
order conditions, the optimal g must be such that (equation (10)) 
[] 0 ) , ( )) ), ( ( ~ ( ) , ( )) ), ( ( ~ ( ) 1 (
1
1
, 1 , , ,









t h g u t h
i
t h g V s g x c U D V s g x c U D T η η ρ δ β ρ δ
where  g D  is the derivative with respect to g. 
  The idea behind the optimal portfolio estimation procedure is that of capturing 
the unexploited investment opportunities for non-participants using their own mean 
utility as pricing kernel.  Thus, by solving the set of equations
13 in (10) and focussing 
on those who do not hold risky assets, I can determine their optimal investment in 
such securities (given the costs) in case of participation to the market.  Similarly, by 
focussing on those who do not hold riskless bills, I can determine their optimal 
investment is such assets.  Notice that, in practice, the actual transaction costs are not 
observed, nor estimated and only the cost bounds are identified.  Therefore, the 
optimal portfolios of risky and riskless assets are determined as a function of a level 
of costs equal to the estimated bounds, which is consistent with the rest of the 
analysis. 
 
3.2.2.  The Transaction Cost Bounds 
The estimation of the cost bounds is based on the conditional moments in (3), which, 
after correcting for sample selection, can be written as: 
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where  t h I ,  is household h information set at time t.  Let  t h W ,  be a collection of non-
negative
14 variables in  t h I ,  observable to the econometrician.  Taking any  t h w ,  in  t h W , , 
it follows from (11) that  
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13 The first-order conditions are necessary, but not sufficient for a maximum, unless the function being 
maximized is strictly concave in the parameters, which needs not be the case in the problem considered 
here.  Thus, the second-order condition must be checked as well. 
14 The non-negativity assumption is not strictly needed.  However, in order to ensure that the inequality 
implied by (1) has the same sign across households, it is necessary that the variables in Wht have the 
same sign across households.  14
As mentioned in the previous section, the lack of a longer panel dimension in the data 
set precludes estimating the individual cost bounds, d.  However, by aggregating 
properly across households, we can identify the bound to the costs for a consumer 
whose expected utility gain equals the mean expected gain.  Then, the relevant 
moment conditions are: 
{ } [ ] 3 , 2 0 ) , ( ) , ( ~
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which yield a consistent estimator of the bounds if the trading rules as a function of 
the parameters are well behaved and if  (.) ~
1 , ,
i
t h t h v w +  is time stationary and has finite 
mean, so that some law of large numbers can be applied.  By means of (13), it is 
possible to estimate consistently the fixed cost lower bound, d≤δ , as a function of ρ uη  
and of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Data 
The data used to estimate the fixed cost bounds are taken from the US Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX), which is a representative sample of the US population, 
run by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey is a rotating panel in which each 
consumer unit is interviewed every three months over a twelve months period, apart 
from attrition.  The data used for the analysis cover the period 1982-1995 and the 
sample consists of 24,643 households.  Each quarterly interview collects household 
monthly expenditure data on a variety of goods and services for the three months 
preceding the one when the interview takes place.  In the final interview, an annual 
supplement is used to obtain a financial profile of the household providing 
information as to the amounts held in checking, brokerage and other accounts, in 
saving accounts, in US saving bonds and as to the market value of all stocks, bonds, 
mutual funds and other securities.  The changes occurred in such stocks over the 
previous twelve months are also reported. 
  The consumption measure I use is deseasonalized, real monthly per-adult 
equivalent
15 expenditure on non-durable goods and services.  Given the timing of the 
data on asset holdings, for each household only two consumption observations are 
                                                            
15 Household per-adult equivalent consumption is obtained from total household consumption using the 
following adult equivalence scale: the household head is weighted 1, the other adults in the households 
are weighted 0.8 and the children are weighted 0.4.  15
used: the one for the month preceding the first interview and the one for the month 
preceding the last, implying a nine-month gap.  It follows that for each household 
only a single observation on the expected utility gain,  (.)] [ 1 , + t h t v E , can be defined.  t is 
the month of the first observation on consumption and t+1 that of the second.  Since 
the interviews take place throughout the year, in the sample used, t runs from 1981:12 
to 1985:5 and from 1986:1 to 1994:12, for a total of 150 periods
16. 
  The household type is determined on the basis of asset holdings twelve months 
before the last interview, which can be computed by subtracting the changes occurred 
over that period to the stocks held at the time of the last interview.  The variables 
“stocks, bonds, mutual funds and other securities” and “US saving bonds” are added 
together and those households who report a non-null amount of such variable are 
defined as risky asset holders.  As a measure of riskless asset holdings, I take the 
amounts held in checking and saving accounts.  Table 1 reports the sample 
composition in each of the years considered on the ground of household asset 
portfolios.  The first column of the Table contains the share of households holding a 
positive amount of both risky and riskless assets.  They represent about 30.5% of the 
sample.  The second column reports the share holding only riskless assets (51% of the 
sample).  The third column indicates how many households do not hold either asset 
(18.5% of the sample).  In the sample used, no household holds only risky assets.  The 
evidence reported in the Table suggests that the share of households owning stocks 
and bonds has increased substantially over the years covered by the survey.  This is 
consistent with the evidence found by Poterba and Samwick (1997) using the US 
Survey of Consumer Finance, which suggests that equity ownership has increased 
over time especially through mutual funds and tax-deferred accounts.  Also, they find 
a sharp rise in the fraction of households owning both tax-exempt and taxable bonds. 
  Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole and for 
the three types of households.  Type 1 households, who participate to both markets, 
are more likely to be headed by a man, the household head is more educated than the 
average, slightly older and more often married.  Their after-tax monthly family 
income is higher, as well as their per-capita consumption.  Those who hold neither 
                                                            
16 See the Appendix for an explanation of the discontinuity and for further details on the data, on 
household selection and exclusions and on variable definition.  16
risky nor riskless assets tend to be the least educated and to have the lowest income 
and consumption and in 41 percent of the cases are headed by a woman. 
  Asset returns are summarized in Table 3.  As risky return I take the total return 
(capital gains plus dividends) on the S&P500 Composite Share Index.  As riskless 
return I take the return on US Treasury bills.  The data in the Table are returns over 
the nine-month period that runs between the two consumption observations used in 
the analysis.  The mean equity premium over the sample period considered is about 
seven percent. 
 
4.2. Estimation  Results 
4.2.1.  The Sample Selection Correction Term 
Before estimating the fixed cost bounds, the sample selection term,  ) , ( , uv t h V s ρ , must 
be determined to account for the censoring of the expected utility gain.  Such 
objective can be achieved by means of a bivariate probit model for participation at 
time t.  The variables included as determinants of the probability of asset holding are a 
polynomial in age, a set of education dummies, the education dummies interacted 
with age, a dummy for the presence of children, a dummy for single person 
households and a dummy for the region where the household resides.  Fourteen year 
dummies are also included.  The first column of Table 4 reports the estimation results 
for the probability of participating to both financial markets.  Such probability appears 
to increase non-linearly with age and with education; it is higher among male-headed 
households and is lower among single person households.  These estimates allow to 
construct the sample selection correction term for the case when the analysis is based 
on those households who do not hold risky securities to bound the costs of 
participating to the market for such assets.  The second column of the Table reports 
the estimation results for the probability of holding either both assets or no assets at 
all, which corresponds to one minus the probability of holding only riskless securities.  
These figures allow to correct for sample selection when computing the risky asset 
market cost bound using only the information on those households who do not hold 
risky assets, but do hold some riskless ones.  Given the apparent disparities between 
those who participate to both markets (type 1) and those who do not participate to any 
(type 3), the results from the estimation are not as clear-cut as those reported in the 
first column and their interpretation is not as straightforward.  The last column of the  17
Table shows the results for the probability of holding either both assets or only some 
riskless assets and allows to correct for sample selection when the analysis is based on 
those who do not hold any financial securities.  The outcome is very similar to that 
reported in the first column, both from a qualitative and a quantitative point of view, 
with households having an older, more educated and male head more likely to 
participate to financial markets. 
  In order to compute the sample selection correction term, as defined in (7), a 
value must be assigned to the unobservable and non-identifiable correlation between 
uh,t and η h,t, which, in the tables below, is set equal to +0.5 and -0.5 to assess the 
effect of a positive correlation in the first case and of a negative one in the second.  
 
4.2.2.  The Optimal Portfolio and The Transaction Cost Bounds 
Three sets of results are presented in this section.  The first set refers to the costs of 
participating to the market for risky assets; the second looks at the possible costs of 
participating to the market for riskless ones and the third set focuses on the two 
markets considered jointly.  Once determined the appropriate sample selection 
correction term, moment conditions (10) and (13) can be used to estimate jointly the 
optimal portfolio and the lower bound to the per-period cost of participating to the 
market of interest.  For identification purposes, two sets of instruments are needed.  
The first set (z), identifying the parameters defining the optimal investment at time t, 
includes the returns on the S&P500 CI and on Treasury bills, the rate of growth of 
GDP and the rate of inflation.  All variables are lagged one period and refer to the 
time interval from t-1 to t.  The second set (w), consisting of good predictors of the 
utility gains in case of participation, includes household monthly consumption and 
income at time t, a second order polynomial in the household head age, two education 
dummies for household head with high school diploma and university degree and all 
the instruments in z (plus a constant).  Thus, the estimation relies on 15 equations to 
determine 5 parameters, which provide the basis for an overidentifying restriction test 
of the model. 
  The Tables 5 to 9, reporting the estimates of the parameters of interest, have 
the following structure.  The results in panel (a) are obtained by setting ρ uη =0.5, those 
in panel (b) by setting ρ uη =-0.5.  Each column is computed assuming isoelastic 
preferences for different levels of risk aversion.  The first row of each table reports the 
estimates of the bound to the fixed per-period participation costs in dollars of year  18
2000.  These are annualized figures obtained by multiplying by twelve the GMM 
estimates that are based on monthly consumption data and, therefore, are an average 
of the mean monthly utility gain over the sample period considered.  The reason for 
multiplying these estimates by twelve is to relate the gains from financial market 
participation to annual expenditure.  The next set of rows in the tables contains the 
estimates of the parameters of the optimal asset portfolio, which implies investing in 
the financial market the share of time t consumption reported in the row before the 
last.  The shares reported are average values; in fact, the portfolio parameters are 
determined using time-varying instruments and consequently the optimal shares to 
invest vary over time.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses
17.  The Sargan test 
of overidentifying restrictions is reported in the last row.  The rate of discount over 
the nine-month period of investment, β , is set equal to 0.98, which implies an annual 
rate of approximately 0.97.  A nine-month rate of 0.99 implies slightly higher bound 
estimates, but the overall conclusions do not change in any significant way. 
 
a.  The optimal portfolio 
  Table 5 and 6 focus on the market for risky assets.  The results in Table 5 are 
obtained by focussing on all households who do not report holdings of risky assets; 
those in Table 6 are obtained using only the information on those who do not hold 
risky assets, but still hold some riskless securities.  The figures reported in the two 
tables are very similar.  Notice also that there are almost no differences between the 
two panels of the tables, suggesting little sensitivity to the value assigned to ρ uη , 
which is chosen arbitrarily.  According to the estimates in the first column of the 
tables, a household with a relative risk aversion of 0.5 could benefit from participating 
to the risky asset market and optimal behavior would involve investing around 12.5% 
of current consumption.  The literature on portfolio choice predicts that as risk 
aversion increases households should reduce their risky asset investments.  This is 
unequivocally supported by the evidence displayed in the Tables, according to which 
as the coefficient of risk aversion increases, the optimal portfolio as a share of 
consumption falls rapidly.  If risk aversion is 3.5, the optimal portfolio of risky asset 
                                                            
17 The standard errors have been corrected to account for the MA(9) structure of the error due to the 
overlapping of the observations on the expected utility gain, which follows from the monthly frequency 
of interviews.  The issue of non-positive definite variance covariance matrix in finite samples has been 
taken care of by using a set of weights like in Newey and West (1987).  19
should correspond to just around 5% of consumption.  The standard errors of the 
portfolio parameters reported in the Tables suggest that the coefficients associated to 
the instruments are generally statistically significant. 
  Table 7 reports the results of an exercise aimed at quantifying the downward 
bias in the transaction cost estimates reported in Table 5.  As mentioned in Section 2, 
the gains from participation are likely to be under-estimated because of the 
unavailability of a measure of cash-in-hand.  Given the information on total after-tax 
family income, it is possible to make an assumption as to the wealth held in liquid 
lower-return assets that is likely to be either invested in the risky asset or consumed 
immediately, once paid the participation cost and gained access to the higher return 
risky asset market
18.  The estimates reported in the Table result from the assumption 
that households can reallocate one percent of monthly income and that the savings 
they reallocate are initially invested in a zero return asset.  The one percent income 
figure is low; yet, it seems reasonable since total after-tax income does not account for 
mortgage payments, health insurance, retirement contributions, etc. which limit 
considerably the amount of liquid wealth immediately available for reinvestment.   
Also, one percent of income corresponds to approximately 4.5 percent of the monthly 
consumption figures used in the analysis. 
  The Table reports the optimal portfolio as a share of “estimated” cash-in-hand: 
a household with a relative risk aversion of 0.5 should invest in the risky asset market 
around 16 percent of its cash-in-hand; one with a risk aversion of 3.5 should invest 
around 10 percent.  Compared to the figures in Table 5, those in Table 7 suggest that, 
if households can invest in the risky asset market also part of their accumulated 
wealth, they will reduce their consumption slightly less if they are little averse to risk 
and relatively more if they are more risk averse.  Yet, overall, the differences in terms 
of reallocation of current consumption between the two sets of Tables are rather small 
- less than one percentage point – and are the result of the complex interaction of the 
investment riskiness with the fact that transaction costs are fixed and more resources 
are now available for investment. 
  To verify whether there are differences in the costs of participating to different 
financial markets and to get some sense of the magnitude of these differences, I have 
used the model for the expected utility gain to determine the benefit that those 
                                                            
18 See footnote 8 in Section 2.  20
households who hold neither risky nor riskless portfolios would reap by investing in 
riskless assets.  The set of results, shown in Table 8, is obtained by focussing on these 
agents and using moment conditions (10) and (13) to estimate jointly the optimal 
portfolio and the lower bound to the costs of participating to such market.  The 
portfolio parameters estimates suggest that a household with a risk aversion of 0.5 
could increase its utility by investing in the riskless asset market around 8 percent of 
its consumption.  As before, as risk aversion increases, the utility maximizing 
investment decreases, but the rate of decrease is much lower than in the case of a risky 
asset portfolio.  The standard errors of the coefficients associated to lagged returns are 
generally statistically significant, whereas the evidence on the coefficients of GDP 
and inflation is mixed, suggesting that the latter have little additional predictive power 
over lagged asset returns. 
  Finally, I have considered the case where households holding neither risky nor 
riskless portfolios are allowed to invest in both (or either) assets after paying a fixed 
cost unrelated to the specificity of the investment.  As instruments to determine the 
optimal share of consumption to invest in financial assets, I use lagged returns on T-
bills and on the S&P500 CI and lagged GDP growth and inflation.  To compute the 
optimal portfolio share of risky assets, I use the equity premium lagged one period
19. 
  Table 9 reports the results of the estimation.  As before, as risk aversion 
increases, the total optimal investment in risky and riskless assets as a share of 
consumption decreases.  Yet, the portfolio parameter estimates exhibit an interesting 
feature: in fact, they suggest that if the costs were low enough, households would 
choose to participate to financial markets by holding an optimal portfolio consisting 
almost exclusively of risky assets.  Only, for a coefficient of risk aversion equal to 2.5 
or higher, riskless asset holdings become non-negligible.  This result suggests that, if 
they can choose between risky and riskless assets, households clearly prefer the 
former, which could be expected given the assumption of single fixed participation 
cost vis á vis the considerable risk premium.  Yet, as risk aversion increases, the high 
volatility of risky returns makes these securities less desirable and households rapidly 
reduce their risky asset holding.  At the same time, they start investing in riskless 
                                                            
19 For computational reason, both the overall investment as a share of consumption and the share 
invested in risky assets are determined by means of logit transformations of the coefficients of the 
instruments (see footnote 12).  This implies ruling out the possibility of borrowing at the riskless rate 
and saving in the risky asset.  21
assets which provide a convenient means of smoothing consumption at a very low 
risk.  As it will be discussed more thoroughly later, the benefits related to 
consumption smoothing can be expected to be rather important for this group of 
households, whose expenditure at time t+1 is lower than that at t by 10% on average. 
  Before turning to the results concerning the lower bounds to the costs of 
participating to financial markets, it is worth addressing the issue of the sensitivity of 
all the estimation results to the value
20 taken on by ρ uη  in the sample selection 
correction term.  Under self-selection, those individuals who have a “comparative 
disadvantage” with financial market participation will not hold financial assets 
because their gain is lower than that of a randomly selected sample of individuals with 
the same characteristics.  Thus, the need to control for the exclusion of asset holders 
when estimating the participation gain.  The lack of sensitivity to the value taken on 
by the correlation between the unobservable of the model for the utility gain from 
participation and the unobservable affecting the likelihood of participating can be 
interpreted as evidence of very limited self-selection. 
 
b.  The transaction cost bounds 
The discussion in the previous section on optimal portfolios showed that those who 
have chosen not to hold one or more of the available securities could increase their 
utility by participating optimally to the relevant markets.  Yet, if participation costs 
are high enough, any gain would be eliminated and non-participation becomes 
optimal. 
  Table 5 and 6 report the estimates of the lower bound to the costs rationalizing 
non-participation to the risky asset market.  According to the figures in Table 5, panel 
(a), a household with relative risk aversion of 0.5 would not net any positive gain 
from participating optimally to the risky asset market if the annual costs involved 
were greater than $91.  As risk aversion increases, the estimated bounds decrease at a 
falling rate and tend to level off for coefficients of risk aversion above 2.5/3.  This 
trend in the estimates results from the fact that the lower bound is a measure of the 
gains from participation and, when the investment is risky, such gains are lower the 
more concave the utility function.  The standard errors reported in parenthesis imply 
                                                            
20 In addition to ± 0.5, other values (not reported for brevity) have been tried.  No important difference 
in either the portfolio parameters or the bounds has been recorded.  22
that the bounds are estimated with acceptable precision.  In fact, the 95% confidence 
intervals range from approximately $45 to $137 for a risk aversion of 0.5 and from 
$53 to $80 for a risk aversion of 3.  Finally, the Sargan test, whose p-value is reported 
in parenthesis in the last row of the Table, never rejects the overidentifying 
restrictions to the model, providing evidence in favor of the hypothesis of correct 
specification.  Notice, that, like with portfolio parameters, there are negligible 
differences between Table 5 and 6 and also between the two panels of each Table. 
  As pointed out earlier, these figures are obtained without accounting for 
household cash-in-hand and for the possibility of reinvesting accumulated savings.  
As a consequence, they can be expected to be somewhat downwardly biased.  Table 7 
addresses the issue of the severity of this problem.  According to the Table, a 
household with a risk aversion of 0.5 that can reinvest one percent of its after-tax 
income, in addition to reallocating its consumption expenditure, will not net a positive 
gain from optimal risky asset holding if the annual participation costs are higher than 
approximately $148.  The set of estimates of the gains from participation in Table 7 is 
to some extent higher than those seen before, as it could be expected given the fixed 
nature of the costs vis-á-vis the fact that now households have more resources to 
invest.  Yet, they remain reasonably low to be thought to bound actual market 
frictions.  Also, they can be expected to fall rapidly when assuming that the 
accumulated saving that are to be moved into the costly security were invested in a 
positive return asset instead of a zero return one, like I have assumed here.  According 
to the figures in Table 7, as risk aversion increases, the estimated bound does not 
change significantly. 
  Next, to address the issue of the differences in the costs of different financial 
portfolios, I have estimated the gains from participating to the riskless asset market, 
using the information on those households who hold no financial securities.  The point 
estimates of the bounds, reported in Table 8, are always strongly significant, 
suggesting that investing in riskless assets is also somewhat costly.  According to the 
Table, for a household with a risk aversion of 0.5, it is optimal not to participate to the 
riskless asset market, if participation involves costs that are higher than around $24.  
These figures suggest that the gains from holding riskless assets are quite small and, 
as expected, they are significantly smaller than those recorded for risky asset market 
participation, at least for low levels of risk aversion.  Yet, they tend to increase rapidly 
as risk aversion increases: in fact, for a household with a risk aversion of 3.5 the  23
bound estimate is above $63, which is of the same order as the bound for non-
participants to the risky asset market with similar risk aversion (see Table 6).  As to 
the precision of the bound estimates as measured by the width of the confidence 
intervals, like in the previous tables it appears to be negatively correlated to the size of 
the bound.  However, in the case of riskless asset markets, it appears to be slightly 
larger, with somewhat narrower confidence intervals.  Finally, as before, a Sargan test 
of the over-identifying restrictions never rejects the null of correct specification of the 
analysis. 
  The positive relationship between the bound estimates and the degree of risk 
aversion is due to the specific nature of the gains from having access to a riskless 
security.  In fact, the main benefit in terms of utility from investing in such assets 
comes from the possibility of smoothing consumption over time, without increasing 
significantly consumption risk, although life-time consumption does not rise 
significantly because of the limited size of the returns.   The more risk averse the 
agent, the greater the utility gain from smoothing consumption, the higher the bound 
to the cost rationalizing non-participation.  As I have mentioned before, in the sample 
I use those who do not hold riskless assets exhibit falling consumption, on average.  
Such behavior can hardly be rationalized within the standard neo-classical model for 
consumption, according to which these households would undoubtedly benefit from 
smoothing consumption by investing in a riskless asset.  Yet, if the costs involved in 
shifting consumption over time are higher than the estimated bound, their choices can 
be fully rationalized. 
  The last type of analysis I have carried out aims at determining the gain from 
having access to a market where both risky and riskless securities can be traded.  The 
gain represents the lower bound to the single fixed cost rationalizing the behavior of 
those households in the sample that have chosen not to hold any financial asset.  Table 
9 reports the results of the estimation: for a household with 0.5 relative risk aversion, 
the point estimate of the bound is approximately $60.  As risk aversion increases, the 
lower bound at first does not change or decreases somewhat, but then start increasing 
and for a risk aversion coefficient of 3.5, it is around $75.  Overall, the results in 
Table 9 are consistent with those in the previous tables and shed further light on the 
nature of the gains and, therefore, on the lower bound to the costs of financial market 
participation.  In fact, the trend in the bound estimates, together with those in the 
portfolio parameters suggest that the nature of the gain is different at different levels  24
of risk aversion.  As discussed in the previous section, if the participation cost is 
unrelated to the type of investment and households can choose between risky and 
riskless assets, they appear to prefer the former, which could be expected given the 
considerable risk premium.  Yet, as risk aversion increases, the utility benefit from 
holding a risky portfolio for its high expected return falls rapidly and households tend 
to reduce their investment because of the high volatility of the risky returns.  Besides 
rising expected life-time consumption, risky assets can also provide a means of 
smoothing consumption, which is particularly valuable for the sample of households 
considered here and this helps explain the increase in the bound that can be recorded 
for values of risk aversion above 2/2.5.  Also, at these levels of risk aversion, which is 
when consumption-smoothing considerations appear to become important, households 
do not just reduce their overall investment, but also switch to riskless assets, which 
provide a convenient means of smoothing consumption at a very low risk.  Finally, 
notice that for levels of risk aversion above 2, the bound estimates in Table 9 are 
comparable to those in Table 8, which refer to the market for riskless assets, although 
they are somewhat higher, probably as a result of the higher return of the means 
available to smooth consumption. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper focuses on the issue of limited participation to financial markets and 
determines a lower bound on the level of fixed participation costs that is required to 
reconcile observed consumption choices with asset returns within an isoelastic utility 
framework.  The bound is obtained from the set of conditions that ensure the 
optimality of observed behavior for financial market non-participants.  The evidence 
found suggests that reasonably low costs can justify observed behavior for degrees of 
risk aversion held as realistic by the literature.  In fact, under the assumption of log 
utility, conservative estimates corresponding to the upper extreme of 95 percent 
confidence intervals imply a lower bound to the annual fixed costs that rationalize 
non-participation to risky assets markets in the range of 95-175 dollars, which 
amounts to less than 0.4-0.7% of household annual consumption.  To justify non-
participation to riskless asset markets, smaller frictions are sufficient. 
  An interesting point that has emerged from the analysis is that for many 
households most of the gains from financial market participation are not as much 
related to the size of the returns, as to the benefits from smoothing consumption.   25
However, overall, for the sample of non-participants considered here, the gains from 
participating to financial markets do not appear to be large enough to justify the 
investment vis-á-vis the costs.  The results based on a “guess” of household cash-in-
hand suggest that this might be due to the fact that the resources available for 
investment are limited.  Yet, the differences in terms of wealth between participants 
and non-participants do not seem wide enough to justify such different asset holding 
behavior.   A more reasonable explanation can instead be found in the amount of 
household heterogeneity, both observable and unobservable, which appears to explain 
the differences in the consumption patterns across household types.  In fact, 
participants and non-participants are likely to differ in terms of taste for risk, 
individual ability, faculty of modifying labor supply, etc.  Differences in all these 
factors can be expected to have an effect both on the gains from asset holdings and on 
the costs of financial market participation, in which case, the kind and the size of the 
benefits of observed financial market participants will be very different and much 
larger than those recorded for non-participants, whereas the level of costs, especially 
of figurative charges, can be expected to be much smaller. 
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Appendix 
Data Description 
The data used to estimate the fixed cost bounds are taken from the US Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX), which is a representative sample of the US population, 
run by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey is a rotating panel in which 
interviews take place throughout the year and each consumer unit is interviewed every 
three months over a twelve months period. This rotating procedure is designed to 
improve the overall efficiency of the survey and to reduce the problems of attrition. 
New households are introduced into the panel on a regular basis as old ones complete 
their participation and, as a whole, about 4500 households are interviewed each 
quarter, more or less evenly spread over the three months. 
  The data used for the analysis cover the period 1982-1995.  I exclude from the 
sample those households with incomplete income responses and those living in rural 
areas or in university housing.  In addition, I exclude those whose head was less than 
twenty-five or older than sixty-five (about 10,000 households), those who do not 
participate to all interviews (about 33% of the initial sample), the top 0.1 percent and 
the bottom 1.7 percent of the income distribution.  The reason for this latter selection 
is to exclude about 500 households who report a total after-tax income below $3,500 
and who are likely to consume all their income and have no resources to invest in 
financial markets.  Finally, I select out those households with average monthly per-
adult equivalent consumption
21 lower than $250 (about 1,000 households 
corresponding to 3.6% of the sample) and those who report a change in per-adult 
equivalent consumption over the nine months period, ∆ ch,t, greater than $1,750 in 
absolute value (about 500 households).  For several households the financial 
supplement contains many invalid blanks either in the stocks of assets or in the 
changes occurred with respect to the previous year.  Since I am interested in the asset 
holding choice, - and not in the actual amounts held -, I keep not only those 
households who report both a “valid stock” and a “valid change”, but also those who 
report only one of the two amounts of interest
22.  Overall, the sample used consists of 
24,643 households. 
                                                            
21 See footnote 15 in Section 4. 
22 About 3,000 households report invalid information in either the flows or stocks of financial assets.  29
  The consumption measure I use is deseasonalized, real
23 monthly per-adult 
equivalent expenditure on non-durable goods and services.  The exclusion of durable 
consumption is grounded in the assumption of separability of preferences between 
durables and non-durables/services.  Given the timing of the data on asset holdings, 
for each household only two consumption observations are used: the one for the 
month preceding the first interview and the one for the month preceding the last, 
implying a nine-month gap.  It follows that for each household only a single 
observation for the expected utility gain,  (.)] [ 1 , + t h t v E , can be defined.  t is the month of 
the first observation on consumption and t+1 that of the second.  Because of this 
matching of households forward in time, a problem arises around 1985-86 when the 
sample design and the household identification numbers were changed.  As a 
consequence, it is not possible to match forward those households who have their first 
interview in the third and fourth quarter of 1985 and they are excluded from the 
sample.  Thus, the sample used consists of households who have their first interview 
between 1982:1 and 1985:6
24 and between 1986:1 and 1995:1, which implies that t, 
the month of the first observation on consumption, runs from 1981:12 to 1985:5 and 
from 1986:1 to 1994:12, for a total of 150 periods. 
  The household type is determined on the basis of asset holdings twelve months 
before the final interview, which can be determined by subtracting the changes 
occurred over that period to the stocks held at the time of the last interview
25.  The 
variables “stocks, bonds, mutual funds and other securities” and “US saving bonds” 
are added together and those households who report a non-null amount of such 
variable are defined as risky asset holders.  As a measure of riskless assets, I take the 
amounts held in checking and saving accounts.  Less than 0.4% of the households 
reports only holdings of risky assets: these households are dropped from the sample. 
 
                                                            
23 Nominal consumption is deflated by means of household specific indices based on the Consumer 
Price Index provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The individual indices are determined as 
geometric averages of elementary regional price indices, weighted by the shares of household 
expenditure on individual goods.  See Attanasio and Weber (1995) for a more extensive discussion of 
these indices.  
24 For the first quarter of 1986, the Bureau of Labor Statistics created two files: one based on the 
original sample design and one based on the new design.  After the first quarter, no track is kept of the 
households in the old sample.  Thus, I can match forward only those households in the original sample 
who had their first interview before July 1985.   30
 
Derivation of the Sample Selection Correction Term 
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Normality implies that  
t h t h u t h u , , , ζ η σ η + =          ( A 2 )  
where  t h, ζ  is an error term, normally distributed with zero mean and standard 
deviation  ζ σ  and orthogonal to  t h, η  by construction.  In order to determine the 
sample selection correction term,  ) , ( , η ρ u t h V s , I must compute the conditional 
expectation  { } 1 | ) exp( , , ≠ t h t h D u E , where  1 , ≠ t h D  if  t h t h V , , − ≤ η .  Using (A2) and the 
fact that ζ h,t is independent of η h,t, I can rewrite such conditional expectation as 
follows 
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where the second equality follows from (A2).  The other term of (A3) can be 
developed as 
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which follows from the fact that Dh,t≠ 1 if  t h t h V , , − ≤ η .  The integral at the numerator 
can be rewritten as:  
                                                            
25 When either of the two variables is missing, I define the household as asset holder either if they hold 
a positive amount of the asset at the time of the fifth interview or if they report a non-null change with 
























− ⋅ = ⋅
t h






















, 5 . 0
, , , ,
2
exp ) 2 (
2






































t h u t h
t h
t h u v
+ − − =
− − = −
      ( A 7 )  

















η σ η π
σ







t h t h
u
V
t h u t h
u V






t h t h



































































































































































   (A9) 
Since both uh,t, and η h,t have unit variance, I can rewrite (A9) in terms of correlation 
between uh,t and η h,t, instead of covariance, and obtain the sample selection term used 
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Table 1: Sample Composition 
 
Year  Type 1 (%)  Type 2 (%)  Type 3 (%)  Total 
households 
1982 26.6 55.3 18.1 1957 
1983 27.1 54.9 18.0 2004 
1984 27.6 54.9 17.5 1987 
1985 25.4 54.5 20.1  967 
1986 30.2 52.6 17.2 1935 
1987 31.2 51.3 17.5 1940 
1988 30.8 50.3 18.9 2003 
1989 30.3 50.9 18.8 2001 
1990 29.3 52.1 18.6 1978 
1991 34.3 45.9 19.8 2027 
1992 34.7 46.5 18.8 1841 
1993 32.8 47.9 19.3 1910 
1994 33.7 47.4 17.9 1939 
1995 38.3 40.9 20.8  154 
Total 30.5 51.0 18.5 24643 
 
NOTE: The relatively small number of households in 1985 is due to the fact that in 1986 the sample 
design and the household identification numbers were changed.  Those households who entered the 
survey after June 1985 were dropped (or had their identifier changed) before reaching the last interview 
(see Appendix). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the total sample and for the three types of 
households 
 
  Type 1  Type 2  Type 3  Whole Sample 
Age  (mean)  43.88 42.32 43.65 43.04 
Less than high school (%)  5.79  14.84  32.21  15.29 
High school diploma (%)  51.30  59.30  53.41  55.76 
College  degree  (%)  42.91 25.86 14.38 28.95 
Male  (%)  77.81 69.24 58.96  69.958 
Single  person  (%)  14.31 20.20 18.02 18.00 
Married  (%)  76.70 63.75 53.56 65.82 
Children  (%)  49.30 47.89 53.52 49.36 
North-East  (%)  21.26 18.16 28.09 20.94 
Mid-West  (%)  27.45 26.12 24.67 26.26 
South  (%)  26.69 28.36 29.80 28.12 
West  (%)  24.60 27.35 17.45 24.68 
After  tax  monthly  income  $5,499 $3,957 $3,088 $4,267 
c1 (mean)  $925 $774 $697 $797 
c2 (mean)  $927 $770 $631 $789 
      
No. of Observations  7,527  12,555  4,561  24,643 
 
NOTE: All figures are in dollars of year 2000. 
 
Table 3: Average Nine-Month Returns (1981:12-1995:09) 
 
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
S&P500CI  0.1208 0.1277 -0.1839 0.5932 
T-Bills 0.0488 0.0167 0.0217 0.0886 
  33
 
Table 4: Results of Probit Estimation 
 
  Probit for probability 
of holding risky assets 
Probit for probability 
of holding either risky 
and riskless assets or 
no assets 
Probit for probability 
of holding some asset 
(risky or riskless) 
Age  6.05 1.74 3.67 
  (1.82) (1.66) (1.96) 
Age
2  -4.41 -1.85 -2.39 
  (1.76) (1.61) (1.90) 
Age
3  1.20 0.61 0.53 
  (0.55) (0.50) (0.59) 
High School Diploma  1.23  -0.56  1.22 
  (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) 
College Degree  1.78  -0.57  2.10 
  (0.15) (0.11) (0.13) 
Sex  0.27 0.01 0.31 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Single  -0.22 -0.14 -0.08 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
North East  0.04  0.31  -0.45 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Mid-West 0.09  0.16  -0.16 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
South -0.01  0.13  -0.23 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Children -0.02  0.10  -0.17 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Age*High School Diploma  -0.46  0.42  -0.50 
  (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) 
Age*College Degree  -0.55  0.68  -1.01 
  (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) 
Constant  -4.26 -0.57 -1.50 
  (0.62) (0.55) (0.65) 
     
p-value Year Dummies  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
     
No. of Observations  24,643  24,643  24,643 
Pseudo R
2  0.0715 0.0206 0.0851 
 
NOTE:  Standard errors in parentheses.  34
Table 5: Estimates of the Lower Bounds to the Transaction Costs for the Market for 
the Risky Asset and of the Corresponding Optimal Portfolios (17,116 households)  
 
Panel (a): (ρ uη =0.5)  
  γ=0.5  γ=1  γ=1.5  γ=2  γ=2.5  γ=3  γ=3.5 
90.88 71.00 65.71 64.00 64.30 66.54 70.96  Transaction 
costs bound  (23.43)  (13.18)  (9.38) (7.42) (6.58) (7.04) (9.35) 
         
Rt-1,t  1.57 1.08 0.85 0.70 0.59 0.48 0.39 
  (0.82) (0.52) (0.42) (0.39) (0.40) (0.43) (0.50) 
R
f
t-1,t  0.89 1.62 1.95 2.15 2.28 2.40 2.46 
  (0.81) (0.52) (0.42) (0.40) (0.42) (0.47) (0.54) 
gt-1,t  -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 






















  (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Optimal  portf.         
as  %  of  12.55  8.43 6.94 6.13 5.62 5.27 5.03 
c o n s u m p t i o n          
         
Sargan  test 13.15 12.78 12.35 11.37 10.07 11.47 11.21 
(dof = 10)  (0.22) (0.24) (0.26) (0.33) (0.43) (0.32) (0.34) 
 
Panel (b): (ρ uη =-0.5) 
  γ=0.5  γ=1  γ=1.5  γ=2  γ=2.5  γ=3  γ=3.5 
89.15 69.88 64.70 63.00 63.37 65.80 70.96  Transaction 
costs bound  (22.47)  (12.74)  (9.13) (7.28) (6.49) (6.86) (8.89) 
         
Rt-1,t  1.57 1.08 0.85 0.71 0.59 0.48 0.40 
  (0.82) (0.53) (0.43) (0.39) (0.39) (0.42) (0.48) 
R
f
t-1,t  0.90 1.63 1.95 2.15 2.29 2.40 2.47 
  (0.82) (0.53) (0.43) (0.39) (0.41) (0.45) (0.51) 
gt-1,t  -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 






















  (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Optimal  portf.         
as  %  of  12.47  8.35 6.86 6.06 5.55 5.21 4.99 
C o n s u m p t i o n          
         
Sargan  test 13.24 12.87 12.54 11.63  9.98  11.68 11.63 
(dof = 10)  (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (0.31) (0.44) (0.31) (0.31) 
 
NOTE:  The results in panel (a) are obtained by setting ρ uη =0.5, those in panel (b) by setting ρ uη =-0.5.  
Each column is computed assuming isoelastic preferences for different levels of risk aversion and 
assuming an annualized discount rate equal to 0.97.  The first row of each table reports the estimates of 
the bound to the fixed annualized participation costs in dollars of year 2000.  The next set of rows in 
the tables contains the estimates of the parameters of the optimal asset portfolio, which implies 
investing in the financial market the share of time t consumption reported in the row before the last.  
The shares reported are average values.  Standard errors in parentheses.  The Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions is reported in the last row, with p-values based on 10 degrees of freedom in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6: Estimates of the Lower Bounds to the Transaction Costs for the Market for 
the Risky Asset and of the Corresponding Optimal Portfolios (12,555 households) 
 
Panel (a): (ρ uη =0.5) 
  γ=0.5  γ=1  γ=1.5  γ=2  γ=2.5  γ=3  γ=3.5 
95.72 73.52 66.62 63.17 61.30 60.92 61.62  Transaction 
costs bound  (26.00)  (15.19)  (11.02)  (9.10) (7.96) (7.52) (7.89) 
         
Rt-1,t  1.50 0.96 0.70 0.55 0.42 0.31 0.20 
  (0.84) (0.53) (0.42) (0.37) (0.35) (0.36) (0.40) 
R
f
t-1,t  1.05 1.87 2.26 2.50 2.69 2.86 3.02 
  (0.82) (0.52) (0.40) (0.36) (0.36) (0.40) (0.47) 
gt-1,t  -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 






















  (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Optimal  portf.         
as  %  of  12.42  8.24 6.71 5.86 5.31 4.92 4.64 
C o n s u m p t i o n          
         
Sargan  test 12.48 12.66 13.06 13.01 12.48 11.91 11.30 
(dof = 10)  (0.25) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.29) (0.33) 
 
Panel (b): (ρ uη =-0.5) 
  γ=0.5  γ=1  γ=1.5  γ=2  γ=2.5  γ=3  γ=3.5 
91.91 71.12 64.78 61.69 60.08 59.60 60.22  Transaction 
costs bound  (24.25)  (14.23)  (10.53)  (8.54) (7.56) (7.24) (7.77) 
         
Rt-1,t  1.52 0.97 0.71 0.55 0.41 0.29 0.17 
  (0.82) (0.52) (0.41) (0.36) (0.35) (0.37) (0.42) 
R
f
t-1,t  1.01 1.85 2.25 2.46 2.70 2.88 3.05 
  (0.81) (0.51) (0.40) (0.36) (0.37) (0.41) (0.49) 
gt-1,t  -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 






















  (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Optimal  portf.         
as  %  of  12.37  8.21 6.68 5.84 5.30 4.91 4.63 
C o n s u m p t i o n          
         
Sargan  test 12.68 12.70 12.91 12.81 12.36 11.92 11.31 
(dof = 10)  (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.26) (0.29) (0.33) 
 
NOTE:  The results in panel (a) are obtained by setting ρ uη =0.5, those in panel (b) by setting ρ uη =-0.5.  
Each column is computed assuming isoelastic preferences for different levels of risk aversion and 
assuming an annualized discount rate equal to 0.97.  The first row of each table reports the estimates of 
the bound to the fixed annualized participation costs in dollars of year 2000.  The next set of rows in 
the tables contains the estimates of the parameters of the optimal asset portfolio, which implies 
investing in the financial market the share of time t consumption reported in the row before the last.  
The shares reported are average values.  Standard errors in parentheses.  The Sargan test of 




Table 7: “Cash-in-Hand” Based Estimates of the Lower Bounds to the Transaction 
Costs for the Market for the Risky Asset and of the Corresponding Optimal Portfolios 
(17,116 households)  
 
Panel (a): (ρ uη =0.5) 
  γ=0.5  γ=1  γ=1.5  γ=2  γ=2.5  γ=3  γ=3.5 
148.26 137.80 140.18 144.73 149.89 155.42 160.21  Transaction 
costs bound  (30.73) (20.04) (15.73) (13.25) (11.90) (12.21) (15.42) 
         
Rt-1,t  1.18 0.69 0.48 0.36 0.33 0.22 0.29 
  (0.57) (0.31) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.25) (0.32) 
R
f
t-1,t  0.85 1.45 1.68 1.80 1.81 1.88 1.72 
  (0.58) (0.31) (0.23) (0.21) (0.24) (0.33) (0.44) 
gt-1,t  -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00  0.01 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 






















  (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Optimal  portf.         
as  %  of  16.27 12.53 11.21 10.57 10.20 10.00  9.91 
C o n s u m p t i o n          
         
Sargan  test 13.18 12.96 12.67 12.71 12.78 11.57 10.40 
(dof = 10)  (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.31) (0.41) 
 
Panel (b): (ρ uη =-0.5) 
  γ=0.5  γ=1  γ=1.5  γ=2  γ=2.5  γ=3  γ=3.5 
148.91 139.40 143.88 146.79 152.23 158.09 163.94  Transaction 
costs bound  (29.94) (19.76) (15.65) (13.21) (11.85) (11.92) (14.61) 
         
Rt-1,t  1.18 0.68 0.47 0.35 0.33 0.22 0.27 
  (0.57) (0.31) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.23) (0.29) 
R
f
t-1,t  0.84 1.44 1.68 1.80 1.80 1.88 1.76 
  (0.58) (0.31) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.30) (0.40) 
gt-1,t  -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00  0.01 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 






















  (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Optimal  portf.         
as  %  of  16.31 12.58 11.26 10.63 10.26 10.06  9.97 
C o n s u m p t i o n          
         
Sargan  test 13.23 12.99 12.75 12.82 12.77 11.20  9.84 
(dof = 10)  (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.34) (0.45) 
 
NOTE:  The results in panel (a) are obtained by setting ρ uη =0.5, those in panel (b) by setting ρ uη =-0.5.  
Each column is computed assuming isoelastic preferences for different levels of risk aversion and 
assuming an annualized discount rate equal to 0.97.  The first row of each table reports the estimates of 
the bound to the fixed annualized participation costs in dollars of year 2000.  The next set of rows in 
the tables contains the estimates of the parameters of the optimal asset portfolio, which implies 
investing in the financial market the share of time t consumption reported in the row before the last.  
The shares reported are average values.  Standard errors in parentheses.  The Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions is reported in the last row, with p-values based on 10 degrees of freedom in 
parentheses. 
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Table 8: Estimates of the Lower Bounds to the Transaction Costs for the Market for 
the Riskless Asset and of the Corresponding Optimal Portfolios (4,561 households) 
 
Panel (a): (ρ uη =0.5) 
  γ=0.5  γ=1  γ=1.5  γ=2  γ=2.5  γ=3  γ=3.5 
24.22 30.99 37.00 42.61 48.55 55.37 63.37  Transaction 
costs bound  (3.38) (4.55) (5.72) (7.05) (9.10)  (12.79)  (19.64) 
         
Rt-1,t  0.56 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.38 0.36 
  (0.33) (0.40) (0.44) (0.49) (0.55) (0.65) (0.79) 
R
f
t-1,t  1.75 1.96 1.98 2.03 2.07 2.09 2.05 
  (0.42) (0.49) (0.54) (0.58) (0.65) (0.74) (0.88) 
gt-1,t  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 






















  (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
Optimal  portf.         
as  %  of  7.79 6.43 5.87 5.52 5.27 5.08 4.92 
C o n s u m p t i o n          
         
Sargan  test 13.70 14.40 14.46 14.40 14.24 14.01 13.74 
(dof = 10)  (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) 
 
Panel (b): (ρ uη =-0.5) 
  γ=0.5  γ=1  γ=1.5  γ=2  γ=2.5  γ=3  γ=3.5 
25.13 32.27 38.88 45.36 52.53 61.23 71.94  Transaction 
costs bound  (3.41) (4.53) (5.69) (7.02) (8.93)  (12.16)  (17.90) 
         
Rt-1,t  0.29 0.40 0.41 0.35 0.26 0.17 0.28 
  (0.30) (0.37) (0.41) (0.44) (0.49) (0.56) (0.67) 
R
f
t-1,t  2.06 2.02 2.05 2.14 2.23 2.31 2.31 
  (0.39) (0.45) (0.49) (0.53) (0.58) (0.65) (0.76) 
gt-1,t  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 






















  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Optimal  portf.         
as  %  of  7.76 6.43 5.90 5.59 5.38 5.23 5.11 
C o n s u m p t i o n          
         
Sargan  test 13.22 14.45 14.45 14.33 14.08 13.71 13.37 
(dof = 10)  (0.21) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20) 
 
NOTE:  The results in panel (a) are obtained by setting ρ uη =0.5, those in panel (b) by setting ρ uη =-0.5.  
Each column is computed assuming isoelastic preferences for different levels of risk aversion and 
assuming an annualized discount rate equal to 0.97.  The first row of each table reports the estimates of 
the bound to the fixed annualized participation costs in dollars of year 2000.  The next set of rows in 
the tables contains the estimates of the parameters of the optimal asset portfolio, which implies 
investing in the financial market the share of time t consumption reported in the row before the last.  
The shares reported are average values.  Standard errors in parentheses.  The Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions is reported in the last row, with p-values based on 10 degrees of freedom in 
parentheses. 
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Table 9: Estimates of the Lower Bounds to the Transaction Costs for a Portfolio of 
Risky and Riskless Assets (4,561 households) 
 
Panel (a): (ρ uη =0.5) 
  γ=0.5  γ=1  γ=1.5  γ=2  γ=2.5  γ=3  γ=3.5 
60.57 54.86 56.07 58.91 62.90 68.13 74.64  Transaction 
costs bound  (20.83) (14.96) (14.61) (14.95) (16.96) (21.19) (29.51) 
         
R i s k y   a s s e t s          
(%  of  12.78  8.73 7.27 6.48 5.96 5.59 5.30 
C o n s u m p t i o n )          
R i s k l e s s   a s s e t s          
(%  of  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
C o n s u m p t i o n )          
         
Sargan  test 12.61 12.82 13.12 13.34 12.76 13.93 13.88 
(dof = 10)  (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.24) (0.18) (0.18) 
 
Panel (b): (ρ uη =-0.5) 
  γ=0.5  γ=1  γ=1.5  γ=2  γ=2.5  γ=3  γ=3.5 
63.42 57.38 58.87 62.21 67.08 73.85 82.76  Transaction 
costs bound  (22.43) (16.10) (15.21) (16.73)  (6.95)  (20.70) (28.35) 
         
R i s k y   a s s e t s          
(%  of  12.72  8.71 7.30 6.53 6.06 5.73 5.48 
C o n s u m p t i o n )          
R i s k l e s s   a s s e t s          
(%  of  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
C o n s u m p t i o n )          
         
Sargan  test 12.52 12.78 13.21 13.46 12.76 13.62 13.52 
(dof = 10)  (0.25) (0.24) (0.21) (0.20) (0.24) (0.19) (0.20) 
 
NOTE:  The results in panel (a) are obtained by setting ρ uη =0.5, those in panel (b) by setting ρ uη =-0.5.  
Each column is computed assuming isoelastic preferences for different levels of risk aversion and 
assuming an annualized discount rate equal to 0.97.  The first row of each table reports the estimates of 
the bound to the fixed annualized participation costs in dollars of year 2000.  Standard errors in 
parentheses.  The next set of rows in the tables contains the average shares of time t consumption to be 
invested in risky assets and in riskless ones.  The estimates of the portfolio parameters are available 
upon request.  The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is reported in the last row, with p-values 
based on 10 degrees of freedom in parentheses.  39
















h is household h expected utility gain; dh is the minimal cost which equalises household h expected 












d1      d ˆ   d            d2 